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STATEMENT OF POINTS

1.

That the division of the property belonging

to the parties reflects a pl.Il1ishment of the appellant for
his marital misconduct and represents such a serious inequity
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion by the court below.

2.

That the court below improperly refused to

award appellant the value of his labor on the three personal
~sidences

and one half the gain realized on the sale of the

three homes.

Further, that the actual conduct of the parties

demonstrates that a gift was made and that the parties considered themselves equal owners of their property.

-1-
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STATEMENT OF TI{E KIND OF CASE
'This is an action for divorce by the Plaintiff
against the Defendant where the sole issue is the equitilbll
distribution of the marital estate.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the court Judge Robert F.
Owens, District Judge pro tern and a Circuit Judge of the
State of Utah presiding.

Judgment of divorce from the Defe:.:·

ant was granted to Plaintiff and a division of property and
assets was made.

Defendant appeals only the division of

property and assets.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, WILLIAM LeROY JESPERSON, SR., seeks a
modification of the di vision of property made by the court
below consistent with the points raised in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

!
!

The Plaintiff-Respondent and the De fendan t-AppellJ
were married to each other on March 20, 1973 in Roswell, lie•
Mexico and no children were born as issue of the marriage
(Tr. Pl4, LL12-18).

Plain tiff is now 74 years old and Defe~

ant is now 79 years old (Full Disclosure Financial Declarat'
At the time of the marriage Defendant had no asse:
but had been a contractor and builder prior to the marriaie
and during the marriage did a lot of work on the three res:·!
dences of the parties (Tr. P201, LLll-22).

-2-
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t\ t

the ti me of the marriage P 1 ain tiff had an auto-

mobile, some furniture,

$12,SOO.OO in certificates of deposit,

and $10,000.00 in savings (Tr. P39, LL20-2S).

Plaintiff also

owned a mobile home which she had purchased for $17,SOO.OO
cash (Tr. P38, LL4-9) on September 7, 1972 (Tr. P94 and Defendant's Exhibit 4) just 6-1/2 months prior to their marriage
on March 20, 1973.
At the time of the divorce Plaintiff valued the
automobile at $3,000.00 and the furniture at $2,000.00 (Plaintiff's Full Disclosure Financial Declaration, page 2).

The

St. George mobile home the parties owned had been sold for
$27 ,000. 00 (Tr. Pl09, L22).

After deducting closing costs

of $1,802.67 the parties divided the net sales proceeds of
$25,197.33 according to the trial court's findings with the
Plaintiff receiving $23,778.lS (the first $19,027.00 plus
77"/, of the remaining $6, 170. 33) and the Defendant receiving
$1,419.18 (23% of the remaining $6,170.33).

The Plaintiff

was awarded the automobile and the furniture (Tr. P290, LL14-20).

The marital estate totaled at least $30,197.33 (the automobile,
furniture, and net proceeds of sale).

Plaintiff received

$28,778.lS, or 9S.3%, and Defendant received $1,419.18, or 4.7%.
Plaintiff testified that her savings and certificates
of deposit were entirely consumed during the marriage for
·I

I
!

moving and traveling expenses (Tr. PSS, L21) and to buy a new
car (Tr. Pl2 3, LLlS-17) .

She also testified that she kept

- 3-
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the books and paid the bills (Tr. Pll+2, Ll6).

Defendant

testified that he always recognized that this money was
tiff's separate property and that he never asked Plainti";.
!, '

any of that money (Tr. Pl92, LL7-15).

Further, that he ci;

not know anything about Plaintiff's savings or certificates
of deposit or if Plaintiff had spent all that money during
the marriage (Tr. Pl97, L25; P204, LLl-2 & P209, L6).

Defrnl

ant testified that Plaintiff could still be in possession
some of that money (Tr. Pl98, L2).

[

The trial court ruled

that any savings or certificates of deposit still in Plaint:

I

name were awarded to her in the divorce (Tr. P290,LL21-25)
Plaintiff testified that $1,050.00 of improvemen::
were added to the $17,500.00 cost of the mobile home in Ruic
New Mexico (Tr. P44, LL6-7, 25).

This home sold for $24,51

(Tr. P92, LlS) and was sold by Mr. Jesperson (Tr. Pl74,

u:

so that there were very few closing costs (Tr. Pl55, LL6-ll,
The Roswell, New Mexico home cost $17,500.00 (Tr. P47, Wl·
and Plaintiff testified that $4,870.10 of improvements we:el
made (adding up Tr. PP49-50) including a refrigerator for
$892.00 that Plaintiff still has (Tr. P261, L23).

The Rosiij

home was sold October 4, 1974, netting the parties $23,10]
after closing costs (Tr. P98, Ll2 and Defendant's Exhibit'.
The St.

George, Utah home and lot cost $19,027.50 (Tr. Pii

958}
L24) and Plaintiff testified that improvements of $6,

were added (Tr. PS 3).

This home was sold and netted the
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1

parties $25,197.33 after all closing costs.
Defendant testified that he did considerable work on
the Ruidoso home, amounting to approximately $2,120.00, including some $220.00 for materials (Tr. PP169-174); that his
labor on the Roswell home was worth approximately $750.00
(Tr. PP176-180); and that his labor on the St. George home
was worth $2,100.00 (Tr. PP183-186 and the trial court's
Findings).

A neighbor, Jesse Spencer, testified that Defend-

ant's work considerably enhanced the value of the property
(Tr. PBS, Lll).
At the time of the marriage Plaintiff had monthly
income from social security of $247 .60 and monthly interest
of $50.00 from an insurance policy (Tr. P40, LL23-25) and her
income at the time of divorce was the same except her social
security is now $263.90 (Tr. P54, L20).

Defendant's income

at the time of the divorce was approximately $241. 00 from
social security (Tr. Pl98, L8).

Neither the Plaintiff nor

the Defendant were employed during the marriage.
Plaintiff is presently living in a mobile home in
Alpine, Texas which she purchased, making a $1,000.00 down
payment with money "borrowed" from her daughter (Tr. P75, Ll9),
who owns a large shopping center (Tr. P57, L9 and Pl97,
LLB-18).

Defendant is presently living in a rented apartment

in California with his widowed daughter (Tr. Pl57, LlS and

Pl61, Ll6).

-5-
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Plaintiff was allowed to testify, ove r De f endant'o
objection (Tr. P22, LL6-16),

to some eleven different r·lffib

that Defendant left the Plaintiff.

In overruling the obje,.

tion the trial judge stated that such instances of desertion
may have some relevance on the property division (Tr. P22
LL17-20),

which was the sole issue before the court.

The

trial judge found that:
"Defendant was guilty of gross and repeated
marital misconduct which not only constitutes
grounds for divorce, but which should be considered in making an equitable division of
property."
(Findings of trial court, paragraph 2)
The proceeds from the sale of the Ruidoso home wm'
made payable to Mr.

& Mrs. Jesperson (Tr. P95, LlO) and

deposited in Roswell State Bank in the name of William and
Venetta Jesperson (Tr. P96, LL2-5).

111e Roswell home was

purchased and held in the names of both parties (Tr. Plll,
LL2 3-25) .

The improvements made on the Roswe 11 home were

paid for through a joint checking account to which they bot"'
made deposits as they received their monthly income (Tr.
PP127-128).

The proceeds from the sale of the Roswell home

were deposited in a joint account at Zion's Bank in St.
George (Tr. PlOO) .

The purchase of the St. George home was

· · ti.a
· 11 y ta k en in
· b ot h parties
·
· · t t e nants • t\e"
ini
names as JOl.n
' ,
1

' i

placed in Plaintiff's name for a period when Defendant hau
some financial trouble with his former

Wl..

J

f.e, and then fin a::,'

Pl ]--I ' ''
put in both their names again on March 11 , 1 9 7 6 (Tr .

LL8-24 and Defendant's Exhibit 3) .
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ARGUMENT
Point 1.

That the division of the property belonging to the
parties reflects a plll1ishment of the Appellant for
his marital misconduct and represents such a serious
inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion
by the court below.
Defendant seeks a readjustment of the property

division made in the decree of divorce.

He does not question

the existence of grounds nor the propriety of granting the
divorce to the Plaintiff.

Defendant claims that the disposi-

tion of the property of the parties is so inequitable and
oojust that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion that
should be corrected.
Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P2d 821
appears to recite the law in this state pertaining to the
grounds upon which a trial court's award may be reversed or
modified when it said, at page 822:
We are in accord with the postulate advocated
~y the defendant that divorce proceedings being
in equity, this court will review the evidence and
may substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court if circumstances warrant doing so. Nevertheless, it is firmly established in our law that the
trial judge will be indulged considerable latitude
of discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties; conversely, however,
if there is such serious ine uit as to manifest
a c ear a use o
iscretion, t is Court wi
ma e
the modification necessar to brin about a 'ust
result.
Exphasis Added .
The Defendant in this case feels he can meet the

-7-
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burden of showing such inequity.

The Plaintiff received

95. 3/. of the marital estate, not counting any savings or
certificates of deposit which she held in her name at the t'of divorce.

These funds were always regarded by the parties

as her separate property even though she may have

vol®tui~

;

consumed or used some of these funds during the marriage.

i

Defendant received only 4. 71'. of their marital estate.

I

The Plaintiff received the furniture which she val'-'
at $2,000.00 and the automobile which she valued at $3,000.0!
These valuations were made under oath by the Plaintiff in a
"Full Disclosure Financial Declaration" required in all contested divorces by order of the Fifth Judicial District Cour:
for Washington County.

Plaintiff also received $23,778.lSi:

cash from the sale of their home in St. George pursuant to
the trial court's "Findings", while the Defendant received
the balance of $1,419 .18 from the sale of the St. George
home as his total property settlement.
The marital estate totaled $30,197.33 and was
distributed as follows:
Item

1. Furniture

2. Automobile
3. Sale of Home
Totals
Per Cent

To Defendant

Value

To Plain tiff

$ 2,000.00
3,000.00

$ 2,000.00
3,000.00

$

25,197.33
$30,197.33

23,778.15
$28,778.15

1,419.18
$ 1,419.18

-----95. 3/.

100%

==========

=====:::::====

-0-0-

4.

n

==========-=
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Defendant contends

that the trial judge

was

influenced by Plaintiff's testimony concerning some eleven
different times the Defendant left the Plaintiff and that the
trial judge imposed a vindictive punishment in the property
settlement upon the Defendant for his marital misconduct.
Counsel for the Plaintiff consumed some 40-50 pages of the
transcript questioning the parties about the times Defendant
left Plaintiff despite an early objection by Defendant's
counsel and an offer to stipulate to grounds for the divorce.
In overruling Defendant's objection the trial judge stated:
"The subject matter is relevant both to the issue
of the grounds of divorce and there may be some
relevance on proper division." (Tr. P22, LL17-19).
There is no question that the trial judge considered the relative guilt of the parties in making the
property settlement.

Paragraph 2 of his "Findings" states:

"Defendant was guilty of gross and repeated
marital misconduct which not only constitutes
grounds for divorce, but which should be considered in making an equitable division of property."
The Utah Supreme Court filed its opinion in April,

1979 in Read v.

Read 594 P. 2d 871, Utah (1979), a case with

many similarities to this case, including the same trial
judge.

In that case the Defendant husband appealed the

trial court's award of about 90% of the assets to the Plaintiff wife, arguing that the award was excessive and inequitable
and that the trial court was imposing a vindictive penalty
upon him because he was most at fault in the breakup of the

-9-
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marriage.

In remanding the Read case for modification

because the property award was far too disparate the Cour:
stated:
"It is well established that the trial court ha
considerable discretion in the allocation oft~
property and financial resources of the partie/
Nevertheless, this discretion is not entirely ·
without limit.
In the case be fore us it appears that the trial
court's property award may reflect a degree of
punishment against the defendant for his extra
marital conduct and relative "guilt" in bringini
about the dissolution of the marriage. A trialv
court must consider many factors in making a
property settlement in a divorce proceeding, but
the purpose of the settlement should not be to
impose punishment upon either party."
The Court in the Read case then stated the law fr
respect to this issue by quoting Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah
2d 79, 296 R 2d 977 (1956) as follows:
"In regard to the defendant's contention that the
judgment represents an effort of the court to
impose a punishment upon him: We recognize that
there is no authority in our law for administerin;
punitive measures in a divorce judgment, and that
to do so would be improper, except that the court
may, and as a practical matter invariably does,
consider the re la ti ve loyalty or disloyalty of thi
parties to their marriage vows, and their relati':i
guilt or innocence in causing the breakup of the
marriage.
It is to be recognized that it is
seldom, perhaps never, that there is any wholly
guilty or wholly innocent party to a divor~
action.
The trial court was aware, of course!
that when people are well adjusted and happy 1~"
marriage, one of them does not just out of a/t~'.;
blue sky fall in love with someone e~se;.an h;
when this occurs it is usually an indication ta
the marriage has disintegrated from other causes.

-10-
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TI1is statement aptly applies to this case.

The

79 year old Defendant testified that he left the Plaintiff
because of her sarcastic nature and because of family disagreements that occurred on some 10 trips to Alpine, Texas
to visit Plaintiff's family (Tr. Pl58, LLlS-22).
In this regard the Martinett case, Supra is
similar and instructive, as the Court, on page 822, stated:
. . the trouble between them (the parties) has
seemed to come largely from inability to make
adjustments to ill health and advancing years,
the matter of considering relative guilt or
innocence in bringing about the divorce was
properly considered by the trial court as minimal
insofar as bearing on their property rights."
The Court went on to say, on page 823, that in
cases such as this that:
"It is necessary to so apply the law as to do
justice between them on the basis of a realistic
appraisal of their circumstances and the problems
each must confront."
Defendant is 79, has a very small income, and finds
it necessary to live with his widowed daughter in a rented
apartment in California.

Plain tiff is 74, also has a small

income, but lives in a mobile home in Alpine, Texas near her
daugher who owns a large shopping center.

The Defendant

testified that all of Plaintiff's children were "very well
fixed financially" (Tr. Pl97, LL21-22), and his testimony
was

not disputed.

The Court stated in the Read case, Supra

that:
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"When a marriage has failed, a court's duty is t
consider the various factors relating to the s·t~
uation and to arr<lnge the best possible alloca~icn
of the property and the economic resourcec; of th
'
parties so that the parties . . . can pursue the~
li ves in as happy and useful a manner as possibl"
If it appears that the decree is so discordant w~t'
an equitable allocation that it will more likel,, · '
lead to further difficulties and distress than ~o
serve the desired objective, then a reappraisal of
the decree must be undertaKen."
The Defendant asks that a reappraisal of the decree
be undertaken by the Supreme Court.
26 Utah 2d 277, 488 ~ 2d 308 (1971)

In Harding v. Harding
the Court said:

"it is the prerogative of this court to review
the evidence, to make its own findings, and to
substitute its judgment for that of the triial
court when the ends of justice so require."
There is no need to remand this case to the trial
court for additional evidence.

To do so would impose a

hardship upon the parties who now reside in Texas and California.

The Supreme Court should review the evidence and

make an adjustment so that the parties can adjust their
lives in a happy and useful manner.
Point 2.

That the court below improperly refused to award
Appellant the value of his labor on the three
personal residences and one half the gain realizeG
on the sale of the three homes.

Further, that the

actual conduct of the parties demonstrates that'
gift was made and that the parties considered
themselves equal owners of their property.

-12-
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The trial court found that the reasonable value
of Defendant's labor on the St. George home was $2,100.00
(paragraph 4 of the trial court's Findings), but failed to
make any findings as to what the reasonable value of Defendant's
labor on the Ruidoso and Roswell homes in New Mexico might
be despite considerable testimony on the subject.
In Corley v. Corley 594

E 2d, 1172, a 1979 New

Mexico divorce case where all the property was the husband's
separate property,

the New Mexico Supreme Court found, on

page 1174, that:
"Mrs. Corley contributed her labor and talents
to the improvements on the 33.185 acres consisting of a three-bedroom house, a barn and an
old milk barn remodeled into a guest house."
The Court then held:
"that the community contributed labor and talent
to the benefit of Carley's separate property.
Mrs. Corley should be given credit for the value
of her share of those contributions."
The trial court erred in not recognizing the
value of Defendant's work on the New Mexico homes.

It is

hard to understand how the trial court could make a finding

on the value of Defendant's labor on the St. George home and
ignor his work on the New Mexico homes.

If the trial court

had recognized the Defendant's labor on the New Mexico homes,
it would not have folild that the $19, 02 7. 50 purchase of the
St. George home all came from Plaintiff's separate flilds but
would have realized that the money brought to Utah and used
to purchase the St.

George home was already charged with

-13-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the value of Defendant's labor on the New Mexico homes
Defendant testified that he did considerable work
on the Ruidoso home, amoun tint; to approximately $2, 120

oo

including some $220.00 for materials (Tr. PP 169-174).

A

breakdown of Defendant's testimony from page 169 to page

11 ~

of the transcript shows that he did the following work and
assigned the following values to his work:
1. Leveling the lot, which was "on
a sloping ridge in the mountains"
and had "big mounds of dirt and
rocks" (Tr. Pl65, LL16-18).
2.
Trim deadwood out of several
pine, oak, and juniper trees.

$ 500.0Q
200.00

3.
Built and painted a three foot
fence arolll1d the lot.
Materials

120. OG

Labor ($100.00 to $150.00)

use 100 .O~

4.
Enclosing, paneling, and
pain ting area lll1der back porch.
Materials

lOU I

Labor

100 .0~1

5.
Landscaping, planting flowers,
shrubs, vines, and lawn and digging
ditch to prevent runoff water
damage to the lot.

~
$2 ,120.0U

Total

:;::::;:::::::::::==:;::

Defendant's labor must have been worth in excess
of this arnolll1t in view of the fact that the home was sold
a few months after the marriage for $24,500.00 for a ~ain
of $3,830.00 after deducting Defendant's labor as follows

-14-
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Sales Price (Tr. P92, Ll5)
Less: Closing Cos ts (Tr. Pl55, LL6-11
and Pl 74, L22)
Proceeds Received
Less:

Original Cost (Tr. P38, LL4-9)
Improvements - Plaintiff's
Testimony (Tr. P44, LL6-7, 25)
Defendant's Labor & Materials
(Tr. PP169-174 and as shown
above)
Total Cost
Profit On Sale

$24,500.00

NONE
$24,500.00
$17,500.00
1,050.00
2,120.00
20,670.00
$ 3,830.00

This is a significant profit for a mobile home,
especially in view of the fact that the home was purchased
September 7, 1972 (Defendant's Exhibit 4) six months prior
to the marriage and sold within a year's time (Tr. P214, L7).
Defendant also testified that he did work on the
Roswell home amounting to approximately $750.00.

A break-

down of Defendant's testimony from page 176 to page 180 of
the transcript shows that he did the following work and
assigned the following values to his work:

l. Rebuilt six foot picket fence
around large lot.

$

2. Repair tool shed.
3. Cut down and dug up stumps
of five tall poplar trees
(about 25 hours x $6.00)
4. Level front yard, reseed the
lawn, plant flowers
5. Paint eaves, windows and doors

150.00
200.00
?

$

Total

300.00
100. 00

750.00

==========

-15-
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Again,

the parties made a profit of $877.79 in

about a year's time when they sold this home on October ,
4

1974 (Defendant's Exhibit 5) even after deducting the impro
ments and Defendant's labor as shown below:
Sales Price (Defendant's Exhibit 5)

$25,000.0G

Less:

1, 894' l'.
$23,105.39

Closing Costs (Defendant's Exhibit 5)

Proceeds Received (Defendant's Exhibit 5)
Less:

Original Cost (Tr. P47,
LL24-25)

$17 ,500.00

Improvements - Plaintiff's
Testimony
(Tr. PP49-50)
Add Back Refrigerator Plaintiff Still Has (Tr. P261, L23)
Defendant's Labor (Tr. PP
176-180 and as shown above)

4,870.10
(892.00)
750.00

22,228.ln

Total Cost

$

Pro fit On Sale

877. 79

The parties lost $2,888.56 on the St. George horr.e
after deducting the improvements and Defendant's labor, pre·
bably because both of them had left Utah and accepted a
price below fair market value.

Their loss is computed belN

$27,000.00

Sales Price (Tr. Pl09, L22)
Less:

1,802.6)

Closing Costs

$25, 197.JJ

Proceeds Received
Less:

Original Cost (Tr. PlOl, L24)$19,027.50
Improvements - Plaintiff's
Testimony (Tr. P53)

6,958.39

Defendant's Labor (Trial
Court's Findings)

28 085 3~

~,

Total Cost

($ 2,858.561

Loss On Sale

===:::;:;:::::::::::::::
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Defendant's labor on all three homes totals
$4,970.00 as follows:
Ruidoso home (see above)

$2,120.00

Roswell home (see above)

7SO.OO

St. George home (see
trial court's Findings)
Total Labor

2,100.00
$4,970.00

The parties realized an overall profit of
$1, 819. 23 on all three homes after deducting the improvements
and after deducting Defendant's labor as follows:
Ruidoso home (see above)
Roswell home (see above)
St. George home (see above)
Overall Profit

$3,830.00
8 77. 79
(2,888.S6)
$1,819.23

With an overall profit it is obvious that the
parties did not need to take any money out of Plaiintiff' s
separate funds in order to 1:.uy or improve any of these homes.
Any of Plaintiff's separate ftmds used in the marriage must
have been used for traveling, moving, or living expenses
and would have to be considered voltmtary contributions to
the commtmity.

Plaintiff testified that they were used for

moving and traveling (Tr. PSS, L21).

They certainly should

not be charged against the Defendant who always regarded
those funds as Plaintiff's separate property (Tr. Pl92,
LL?-15) and who did not and does not know whether Plaintiff
used that money during the marriage (Tr. Pl97, L2S) or whether

-17-
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Plaintiff still has those funds (Tr. Pl98, L2).

It shou\,

be remembered that Plaintiff kept the books and paid the
during the marriage (Tr. Pl42, Ll6)

and that this infor;,,,·

was exclusively within her knowledge.

In this situation.

would be just as wrong to conclude that Plaintiff useri ne:
separate f1.ll1ds to make these improve men ts as it would be:
conclude that Defendant is entitled to credit for one-haL
the improvements simply because the improvements were pc
for out of f1.ll1ds held in joint checking accounts to which
both parties deposited their social security income (Tr. ..
12 7-128).
If one were to mathematically attempt to reduce'
Defendant's award to the minimum and still maintain some

1

semblance of an equitable and logical approach, one would
· · · 1 pureh ase wit.
· h'.1e: I
recognize that Plaintiff made the i.ni.ti.a
1

separate funds,

.I

that improvements were paid for out of pro:.!

from the previous sale, and that Defend<lnt is entitled to
credit for the value of the labor and talent he contribute!
to the improvement of the properties.

The overall profit

$1,819.23 would be divided equally between the parties.
Defendant would receive $5,879.61 and Plaintiff the balar.CI
as follows:
Defendant's labor on all
three homes (see above)
Defendant's one-half share
of overall profit on all
three homes
Total To Defendant

$4 '9 70. 00

909.61
$5,879.61
=~====--==::-
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This approach could be considered a refinement
of Lhe method used in Lundgren v. Lundgren 112 Utah 31, 184
P. 2d 670 where the husband had paid for the property and the
wife had done considerable work making improvements and the

court awarded the wife one-half the excess of the market
value over the husband's original cost.

The court in the

Lundgren case probably did not have the advantage of knowing
the cost of the improvements or the reasonable value of the
labor as it does in this case.

Where such evidence is in the

record the court should recognize both the cost of the
improvements and the reasonable value of the labor before
dividing the overall profit equally between the parties.
Applying this method to this case shows that Defendant is entitled to an award of $5,879.61, or an additional

$4,460.43 over the $1,419.18 he has already received.

Even

so, Defendant's total property award would only come to
19.5% of the marital estate of $30,197.33.

When a court

of equity considers the age of the Defendant (79), the
manner in which the parties handled the proceeds from each
sale and took title on their next purchase (always in joint
bank accounts or in joint tenancy - see last paragraph of
the STATEMENT OF FACTS), and the present living situation
of the parties (Defendant in an apartment with his widowed
daughter and Plaintiff in her own mobile home near her
daughter who owns a large shopping mall), it may well be
that Defendant should have a settlement far in excess of

$6,000 OrJ.
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Several days before the trial Defendont filed a
"Memorandum" with the trial court and mailed a copy to
Plaintiff's attorney.

The Memorandum set forth the facts

and then Pre sented a "Gift Th eory " f or th e reso 1 ution of th'.:
case, citing some 18 cases, 14 cases from 10 different corr;:.or
law states and 4 cases from 2 different community propen:.r
states, showing that a gift results in those states when a
conveyance is taken in the name of the husband ond wife by
the wife's consent and direction, notwithstanding the wife
pays all the consideration.

At the trial it was

evi~nt

from Plaintiff's testimony that she had been advised of thi'
argument and that she was prepared to refute it, possibly
even to the extent of perjury.

On direct examination Plain·

tiff claimed she deposited the proceeds from the Ruidoso sai':
to her savings account which did not have Defendant's name
on it (Tr. P49, L9), but on cross-examination Plaintiff
admitted that the proceeds were deposited in Roswell State
Bank in the names of William & Veneta Jesperson (Tr. P96,
LL2-5).

Again, Plaintiff testified on direct examination

that the improvements to the Roswell home were paidoutofl
her own savings (Tr. PSO, L24), but on cross-examination
Plaintiff reluctantly admitted that the improvements were
paid from a joint checking account (Tr. Pl27, L23).

Again
<·

on direct examination Plaintiff testified that the proceec:
·
d into
·
her savings (Tr
f rom the Roswell sale were deposite
tool:
P52, L25), but on cross-examination admitted that 5 he
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the check with them to California, then to Utah, where she
deposited it in a joint account at Zions Bank (Tr. PlOO,
119-15).

Again, on direct examination Plaintiff testified

that the improvements to the St. George home were paid out
of her own savings account (Tr. P54, LS), but on cross-examination admitted that the improvements were paid from a
joint account (Tr. Pl36, LL3, 8-13).
When the Plaintiff finally admitted that the proceeds of each sale were put in their joint names and that
the title of each home was taken in their joint names, she
then began to claim that it was done under pressure (Tr.
Pll3, LL9-17) and that pressure was exerted upon her almost
from the beginning of the marriage (Tr. Pll5, LL20-24).

This

is entirely inconsistent with the fact that Plaintiff kept
the books, paid the bills, and opened the accounts (Tr.
Pl42, LL13-23).

It is also inconsistent with the fact that

Plaintiff has operated a business and owned property in other
places (Tr. Pll7, LL16-20) and inconsistent with the fact
that, by her own testimony, she had always had an attorney
take care of her properties and yet did not consult an
attorney on any of these transactions (Tr. Pll7, L25
LLl-9).

& Pll8,

It is also inconsistent with Defendant's testimony

that Plaintiff cannot be forced to do anything she doesn't
want to do (Tr. Pl91, LLl0-12).

Certainly, if she was being

pressured to do something against her own desires she would
have been concerned enough to take some corrective action.
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In a situation of this kind where both part'

les ca;,

make self-serving statements concerning their intentio

,
ns 'nt
best evidence of intention is what the parties actually did.
In this case, despite Plaintiff's reluctance to admit what
they actually did,
1.

the record is clear that:

The proceeds from the sale of the Ruidoso horr.e

were made payable to both parties (Tr. P95, LlO);

2.

The Ruidoso proceeds were deposited in Roswell,

State Bank in the name of William and Venetta Jesperson
(Tr. P96, LL2-5);

3.

The Roswell home was purchased and held in

the names of both parties (Tr. Plll, LL21-25);

4.

The improvements made on the Roswell home were.

paid for through a joint checking account to which they both
made deposits of their monthly income (Tr. PP127-128);
5.

The proceeds from the sale of the Roswell

home were deposited in a joint account at Zions Bank (·Tr.
PlOO, LL9-15 and Pl81, LL22-25);
6.

The St. George home was initally taken in the

name of both parties as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship (Tr. Pll2, LL8-13 and Defendant's Exhibit 6);

7.

· Plair··
The St. George home was placed solely in

tiff's name when Defendant had some financial trouble with
his former wife but that it was again placed in both their
.

names as joint tenants with full righs of survivors

-22-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

h1·p whee·

I

Defendant's financial trouble was over (Tr. Pll2, L24 and
Defendant's Exhibit 3); and
8.

The improvements made on the St. George home

were paid for through a joint account (Tr. Pl36, LL3, 8-13
and Pl86, LL7-13).
With eight transactions to illustrate the parties
intention it is doubtful that any kind of testimony to the
contrary could overcome the presumption of a gift and consequent equal ownership, which presumption must be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence or evidence showing fraud,

mistake, or undue influence.

Defendant's Memorandum on this

point and which is in the record on appeal recites 18 cases
from 12 different states supporting this common law doctrine
and additional supporting cases may be found at 43 ALR 2d
917.

Although no Utah cases are included in the annotation,

Defendant believes that this doctrine should be extended
to include Utah.
CONCLUSION
Defendant and Appellant respectfully submits that
the award of over 95% of the marital estate to the Plaintiff
and Respondent is so inequitable that it manifests an abuse
of even that wide latitude of discretion afforded the trial
court and that this Court should modify the property division
to allow the parties to adjust their lives in a happy and useful manner.

-2 3-
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The court should not attempt to penalize one of
the partners in a marriage which has apparently broken
by making what, on its very face,

do·..':i

is a punitive, vindictive

and inequitable distribution of the marital estate.
At the very least Defendant should be allowed to
recover the reasonable value of his labor and talents expen(,
on improving and making three homes more livable, more attrii·
tive, and certainly more valuable,

together with his share

of the overall profit realized on the sale of the three horr.,,
Defendant's age, present living situation, andthe
evidence showing how the parties have held, improved, and
sold their real property shows that Defendant, in equitv, ;,
either entitled to an increased award over and above the va:.
of his labor and share of profits or that he is entitled to
one half the proceeds on the sale of the St. George home
because a gift, which was not adequately rebutted, was made
to the Defendant as shown by the actual conduct of the pare.
DATED this

~day

of September, 1979.

~?_~'#IL /l!;i:~

JdHNLYON MILES

.I

Attorney for Defendant-AP?'

-24Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

